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Archaeological discoveries of traumatic injuries in primitive hominid skulls 
strongly hint that our species has a 
long history of violence [1]. Despite 
repeated attempts throughout 
history, including efforts to eliminate 
violence through the imposition 
of criminal sanctions, we have 
yet to dispel our violent nature. 
Consequently, criminal violence 
remains a common feature of most 
societies. As policy-makers seek 
deeper understandings of criminally 
violent and anti-social behaviour, 
many contemporary neuroscientists 
assume that the essential ingredients 
of the human condition, including 
free will, empathy, and morality, are 
the calculable consequences of an 
immense assembly of neurons fi ring. 
Intuitively, this view opposes Cartesian 
dualism (i.e., the brain and mind are 
separate, but interacting, entities) 
and assumes that violence and anti-
social behaviour emanate from a 
mechanistically determined brain (see 
Box 1).
From this standpoint, the exciting 
discoveries of neuroscience resonate 
far beyond mere philosophical 
banter and may have important 
implications for the way government 
institutions, including education and 
legal systems, operate. For example, 
to the extent that legal systems 
attempt both to move behaviour 
in socially desirable directions and 
also to adjudicate transgressions 
fairly, the legal system’s effectiveness 
can be improved by deepening 
our understandings about why 
people behave as they do and both 
how and why people respond to 
various changes in legal incentives. 
Specifi cally, neuroscience may have 
important implications for both how 
we understand the multiple infl uences 
on violent behaviour and how the 
legal system may better engage with 
violent criminals.
Studies of the Prefrontal Cortex 
in Anti-Social and Violent 
Populations
The birth of what may be coined 
modern “forensic neurology” lies 
in John Harlow’s 19th century 
observations of Phineas P. Gage [2]. 
Gage, a railroad worker, suffered the 
unfortunate experience of having an 
iron bar blasted through the front of 
his brain, which resulted in extensive 
damage to the prefrontal cortex (PFC). 
Despite Gage’s miraculous physical 
and intellectual recovery, conspicuous 
changes in his personality were 
reported. Briefl y, the once courteous 
and diligent man became explicitly 
anti-social. As Gage’s friends famously 
articulated, “Gage is no longer Gage”. 
Since Harlow’s lurid description, 
computerized reconstructions based on 
Gage’s skull fractures have determined 
more precisely the damaged PFC 
regions, which current evidence 
associates with autonomic, social, 
and affect regulation [3]. The case of 
Phineas Gage is compelling to both 
neuroscientists and legal thinkers 
because it provided the fi rst indication 
that reasoning and regard for others 
can be compromised by frontal lobe 
injury. Harlow’s observations have 
led many experts to speculate that 
neurological insult may be a prominent 
factor in recidivistic and violent 
criminal transgressions.
Modern empirical endeavours 
support the claim that the human PFC, 
a latecomer in the brain’s phylogenic 
history, is what makes us rational, 
intellectual, and moral entities (Table 
1). For example, several studies on 
patients with focal frontal lobe injuries 
have supported Harlow’s case [4,5]. In 
one of the largest studies of patients 
with brain damage to date, Grafman 
and colleagues found that increased 
aggressive/violent scale scores were 
most strongly associated with similarly 
localized PFC lesions in a sample of 
279 veterans of the Vietnam War [6]. 
Higher scores were, however, mostly 
associated with verbal aggression and 
less so with physical aggression, again 
fi tting with Harlow’s observations of 
Gage [2]. These studies, along with 
clinical observations, have led many 
to suggest that damage to the PFC 
results in “acquired sociopathy” or 
“pseudopsychopathy”.
Given the PFC’s historical and 
theoretical relevance to adaptive social 
behaviour, it is not surprising that 
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Table 1. Examples of Prefrontal Brain Regions Associated with Pro-Social Behaviour
Brain Region  Pro-Social Behaviour
Anterior cingulate cortex  Empathy [71,72]
Orbital PFC  Regret [24]
Ventromedial PFC  Ethical decisions [73,74]
Ventrolateral PFC  Inhibition of behaviour [75]
 Dorsolateral PFC  Reasoning [46,76]
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050103.t001
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this region was among the fi rst to be 
examined in anti-social and violent 
populations. Raine and colleagues used 
noninvasive structural brain imaging 
to show an 11% reduction in PFC 
grey matter in patients with anti-social 
personality disorder (APD) [7]. These 
decreases in grey matter were also 
associated with decreased autonomic 
arousal to a social stressor (i.e., video-
taped speech about an individual’s 
faults). Similar reductions have been 
observed in a study of aggressive 
patients [8] and of pathological liars 
[9]. Nonetheless, such morphological 
and volumetric abnormalities may not 
necessarily relate to behaviour.
In principal, using brain imaging to 
look at function rather than structure 
should reveal stronger relationships 
between brain and behaviour. Using 
positron emission tomography 
scanning, neuroscientists have found 
attenuated resting regional cerebral 
blood fl ow in the frontal lobes of 
violent individuals [10] and convicted 
criminals [11]. In healthy volunteers, 
evoked anger and imagined aggressive 
transgressions are associated with 
reduced modulation of the orbital and 
medial PFC [12]. Collectively, these 
studies suggest that impulsive violent 
acts stem from diminished recruitment 
of the PFC’s “inhibition” systems.
Beyond the PFC
The PFC is not, however, the only area 
where damage may increase propensity 
toward behaviours deemed criminal 
or anti-social. It has long been known 
that ablation of the monkey temporal 
lobe, including the amygdala, results 
in blunted emotional responses [13] 
(Figure 1C). In humans, brain-imaging 
and lesion studies have suggested a 
role of the amygdala in theory of mind, 
aggression [14], and the ability to 
register fear and sadness in faces [15]. 
According to the violence inhibition 
model, both sad and fearful facial 
cues act as important inhibitors if we 
are violent towards others. In support 
of this model, recent investigations 
have shown that individuals with 
a history of aggressive behaviour 
have poorer recognition of facial 
expressions [16], which might be due 
to amygdala dysfunction [17]. Others 
have recently demonstrated how the 
low expression of X-linked monoamine 
oxidase A (MAOA)—which is an 
important enzyme in the catabolism of 
monoamines, most notably serotonin 
(5-HT), and has been associated 
with an increased propensity towards 
reactive violence in abused children 
[18]—is associated with volume 
changes and hyperactivity in the 
amygdala [19].
The amygdala has been a major 
focus of attempts to understand the 
poor empathy and fear responses 
observed in psychopathic criminals. 
Using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), Birbaumer and 
coworkers [20] presented individuals 
with a paradigm in which the 
appearance of a face on a screen 
was followed by a painful shock in 
one condition but not in a second 
condition. Analysis showed normal 
volunteers to have increased activity 
in the amygdala (see Figure 1) in 
response to faces associated with shock, 
whereas psychopathic individuals 
showed no signifi cant change in 
activity in this region. In addition, 
psychopaths also failed to show 
normal increases in skin conductance 
responses. Importantly, Birbaumer et 
al.’s fi ndings are supported by studies 
showing that the limbic structures 
(i.e., amygdala and hippocampus) are 
functionally abnormal in psychopathic 
criminals during emotional memory 
[21] and by studies showing how 
activity in the amygdala decreases with 
increased scores on the Psychopathy 
Personality Inventory [12,22]. A 
prevailing hypothesis is that in 
psychopathic criminals the prefrontal–
amygdala connections are disrupted, 
leading to defi cits in contextual fear 
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050103.g001
Figure 1. Regions Associated with Normal and Atypical Social Behaviour
(A) Medial and lateral view of the PFC. 
(B) View of the ventral surface of the PFC and temporal poles.
(C) Coronal slice illustrating the amygdalar and insular cortex. 
See also Table 1.
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral PFC; MFd, medial PFC; oMFC, orbitomedial PFC; TP, temporal pole; vlPFC, ventrolateral PFC; vmPFC, 
ventromedial PFC. 
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conditioning [23], regret [24], guilt 
[25], and affect regulation [26].
Does the Crime Fit the Brain?
While many behaviours can be 
unambiguously defi ned, labelling a 
behaviour as “criminal” is to defi ne 
how the behaviour will be considered 
socially. That is, the very same 
behaviour that might not be deemed 
criminal in one social context (say, 
shooting a gun at a target at a shooting 
range) may be deemed criminal in 
another (such as shooting a gun in the 
direction of a crowd of people). Such 
defi nitional ambiguities are at their 
least frequent, however, with respect to 
interpersonal violence, which is broadly 
proscribed.
It is clear in at least some contexts 
that different violent anti-social 
behaviours can arise from different 
etiologies. Animal studies have 
shown that distinct networks underlie 
different types of aggression (e.g., 
predatory attack and defensive rage 
[27]). From these studies, one might 
expect that in humans, distinct neural 
topographies exist in, for example, the 
sexual criminal, the sadistic murderer, 
and the political terrorist. At fi rst 
glance, such reasoning looks like 
phrenological folly; however, evidence 
does suggest that violent behaviour can 
be placed into two broad, yet distinct, 
categories: affective aggression (i.e., 
impulsive, autonomic arousing, and 
emotional) and predatory aggression 
(i.e., premeditated, goal-directed, and 
emotionless) [28].
With this dichotomy in mind, 
Raine and colleagues [29] reanalyzed 
positron emission tomography data 
to tease apart functional differences 
between premeditated psychopaths 
and impulsive affective murderers. 
Compared to controls, the impulsive 
murderers had reduced activation 
in the bilateral PFC, while activity in 
the limbic structures was enhanced. 
Conversely, the predatory psychopaths 
had relatively normal prefrontal 
functioning, but increased right 
subcortical activity, which included 
the amygdala and hippocampus. 
These results suggest that predatory 
psychopaths are able to regulate their 
impulses, in contrast to impulsive 
murderers, who lack the prefrontal 
“inhibitory” machinery that stop them 
from committing violent transgressions. 
Although more work is necessary, these 
studies strongly suggest that some kinds 
of criminal behaviour are associated 
with dysfunction of different regions of 
the brain.
Does Some Criminal Behaviour 
Result from Mental Disorder?
A great deal of empirical research 
demonstrates that mental illness is 
higher in incarcerated populations 
and estimates that as many as 25% of 
defendants evaluated for competency 
are medically and legally incompetent 
to stand trial [30].  Moreover, only 
36% of the public perceive recidivistic 
crime as an organic disorder [31]. 
Consequently, weighing discrepancies 
between intuitions, expert views, and 
empirical fi ndings is of fundamental 
importance to a legal system.
Both the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders and 
International Classifi cation of Diseases 
10 classifi cations of mental and 
behavioural disorders include APD, 
which is defi ned respectively in the two 
classifi cations as a lack of regard for 
the feelings of others and a failure to 
abide by society’s rules. While it can 
be said that any given population of 
incarcerated criminals may not be a 
representative sample of all criminals, 
or even of all criminals who pass 
through the prison system, a systematic 
review of studies examining mental 
illness in 23,000 prisoners showed 
that these prisoners were several times 
more likely to have some form of 
psychosis or major depression, and 
ten times more likely to exhibit APD 
than the general population [32]. 
The authors suggest that, worldwide, 
several million prisoners have serious 
mental illness [32]. Several studies also 
show levels of head injury to be higher 
in violent and death-row criminals 
[33], while birth complications, 
which can often result in neurological 
damage (e.g., hypoxic-ischemic 
encephalopathy) and parental mental 
illness, are higher in anti-social 
populations [31]. More often than 
not, people with APD and violent 
behaviour have a history of childhood 
maltreatment or trauma [34]; having 
such a history has been linked to 
Research linking the brain to anti-
social and criminal behaviour also raises 
neurophilosophical questions concerning 
our liberty. Most neuroscientists hold 
that “minds are simply what brains 
do” [62]. Indeed, with the omission of 
metaphysical constructs like the “mind”, 
many take the view that we are tied to 
the physical brain and, as a consequence, 
have little personal choice. A series of 
classic, yet controversial, studies by 
Benjamin Libet and colleagues showed 
that brain activity associated with 
deliberate decisions can be detected 
shortly before we are conscious of 
making the decision [63]. In these studies, 
participants reported when they fi rst felt 
the intention to make a spontaneous 
movement by noting the position of a 
dot moving on computer screen. They 
apparently fi rst became aware of their 
intentions about 200 milliseconds before 
action execution, which is later than the 
onset of the so-called readiness potential 
(or “bereitschaftspotential”) recorded 
from the scalp prior to movement. 
Despite criticisms about the accuracy 
of this timing method, recent research 
[64,65] has shown that if anything, the 
actual onset of conscious intention 
is likely to be even later. Moreover, 
psychologists report that our attributions 
of agency to actions are often illusory 
[66].
Despite these claims, free will as a 
concept is still unlikely to be eliminated. 
Clearly free will is a prerequisite for 
moral agency, and for society to run 
smoothly, we all need to believe that 
we are in full control of our actions. Not 
surprisingly, some have tried to fi nd a 
middle ground in this argument. For 
example, Raine has entertained the idea 
that free will should be viewed along a 
“dimension rather than a dichotomy” 
([31], p. 320), while Gazzaniga has argued 
that “brains are automatic, but people 
are free” ([52], p. 98). Is it reasonable, 
however, to posit that some people are 
more free than others? For example, few 
can dispute the fact that brain diseases 
such as schizophrenia and Huntington 
disease reduce the ability to act freely. 
Nonetheless, most juries may never have 
explicitly discussed the concept of free 
will [52]. Neurophilosophy may play an 
important role in understanding and 
updating the intuitions concerning free 
will and responsibility that may implicitly 
underlie juror deliberations.
Box 1. Should We Rethink Free Will?
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anomalous development of regions 
associated with anti-social behaviour, 
including the PFC, hippocampus, 
amygdala, corpus callosum, and 
hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis 
[35]. Early damage to the orbitofrontal 
cortex in particular appears to result 
in poor acquisition of moral and 
social rules [36], thus showing the 
importance of the interaction between 
environment and brain development.
Discussing the possibility of 
meaningful links between some anti-
social and violent behaviour and 
various brain disorders can, however, 
enrage retributivists, who point 
out that moral responsibility lies in 
the social rules by which acts are 
judged—not in the brain itself [37]. 
Nonetheless, there are many instances 
where brain disease can lead to anti-
social behaviour, and these inevitably 
pose important complications for 
moral and legal systems that tend to 
divide responsibility for actions into 
dichotomous alternatives—guilty 
versus not guilty—instead of seeing 
responsibility as existing along a 
continuum. For example, compared to 
the general population, individuals with 
frontotemporal dementia, Huntington 
disease, and attention defi cit/
hyperactive disorder have a higher 
prevalence of episodic aggression or 
anti-social conduct. One disturbing 
example cited by Goldberg [38] is the 
case of a New York surgeon who, after 
fi nishing surgery, carved his signature 
in the patient’s stomach. The surgeon 
was later diagnosed with Pick disease 
(a form of dementia associated with 
personality changes that presumably 
result from progressive degeneration of 
frontal and anterior temporal cortices). 
He was not considered responsible for 
his actions by experts, the jury, or even 
the victim. Beyond these examples 
lies the possibility that some forms of 
anti-social or violent behaviour are of 
unspecifi ed origin, which could place 
them in the same category as many 
other neuropsychiatric disorders. 
Presumably, such unrecognized brain 
abnormalities might cause acts of 
gratuitous violence, but the individuals 
concerned would be considered to be 
criminally responsible.
To be clear, there is at present no 
reason to believe that all criminal 
behaviours, or indeed even all violent 
criminal behaviours, are the result 
of organically dysfunctional brains. 
However, there is ample evidence to 
suggest that some kinds of dysfunction 
are likely to increase the probability 
of some kinds of behaviours that 
society labels as criminal. This suggests 
that research is urgently needed to 
elucidate the links between mental 
illness, neurological disorder, and 
criminal conduct. And modern and 
rapidly improving brain-imaging 
techniques may contribute signifi cantly.
Possible Legal Implications
Advances in neuroscience could 
have several implications for the 
legal system. At the broadest level, 
these include (i) understanding 
how cognitive processes of key legal 
participants (such as judges and 
jurors) infl uence trial outcomes, 
(ii) discovering whether various 
assumptions underlying the evidentiary 
rules (such as one suggesting that 
“excited utterances” are less likely 
than average to be falsehoods) have 
any basis in fact, (iii) learning more 
about how people determine “just” 
punishments, (iv) anticipating how 
jurors may over-react to certain kinds 
of character evidence, (v) determining 
the extent of injuries from accidents, 
(vi) improving our abilities to detect 
mental biases and prejudices that may 
affect the proper function of legal 
fact-fi nding and decision-making, and 
(vii) learning more about the limits of 
witness memories. Yet even against this 
broad background, few implications 
for the legal system are more 
important than trying to gain a better 
understanding of important infl uences 
on criminal behaviour.
However, that very signifi cance 
brings its own important challenges. 
On one hand, a better understanding 
may lead to more effective deterrence, 
to more effective treatment, and 
to more just and morally sound 
sentencing. On the other hand, 
determining criminal responsibility 
is a normative legal conclusion, not 
an empirical factual one, made in the 
context of a variety of often confl icting 
aspirations [39]. Therefore, even the 
Lie detection technology is one of the 
most obvious legal uses of brain imaging, 
and several new companies (e.g., No Lie 
MRI) are beginning to commercialise 
their services to lawyers and prosecutors. 
However, despite there being several 
published empirical studies on lie 
detection, results seem to be far from 
conclusive. Early brain-imaging studies of 
how the brain responds when we willfully 
lie showed that specifi c zones of the 
PFC increase in activity when individuals 
lie—the same regions known to come 
online when tasks become more diffi cult 
and when we need to control or inhibit 
responses [67]. However, one problem 
with most studies of lie detection is 
that they use group averages, which 
make fi rm conclusions about individual 
cases impossible. Although more work 
is needed, recent studies on single 
individuals have shown promise, with lie 
detection accuracy in the range of 80%–
90% [68]. Proponents argue that the use 
of brain imaging to detect deception is 
less prone to countermeasures, making 
it more reliable than the polygraph 
test [69]. Not surprisingly, government 
institutions have become increasingly 
interested (e.g., US Department of 
Defense) and have been criticized as 
being “Orwellian”. However like the 
polygraph, brain imaging is unlikely to be 
universally admissible in court until it is 
shown to be valid, reliable, and relevant.
Another technique—
brain fi ngerprinting—uses 
electroencephalography to examine 
the memory and encoding related 
multifaceted electroencephalographic 
response (MERMER). To measure this, an 
individual is shown crime scene pictures 
(i.e., the murder weapon), and changes 
in brain activity (specifi cally the P300 
component) are monitored. The brain 
reacts differently to images it recognises 
versus ones that it does not recognise, 
so, for example, if an individual did use 
a specifi c weapon to kill a person, the 
brain will react differently to images 
of the murder weapon than to images 
of other weapons not used in the 
crime. Brain fi ngerprinting evidence 
has been admitted in some cases, such 
as in the Iowa murder trial of Terry 
Harrington. However, despite its claimed 
potential, brain fi ngerprinting has been 
criticised for problems with developing 
adequate test stimuli, vulnerability to 
countermeasures, and—because it’s 
patented—a failure to be appropriately 
verifi ed by peer review [70].
Box 2. Brain Fingerprinting and Lie Detection
April 2007  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 4  |  e103
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best neuroscientifi c study can only 
afford factual evidence to be weighed 
alongside other behavioural evidence 
and normative considerations, rather 
than actually resolve the legal question 
as to which the factual evidence is 
relevant.
Generally speaking, in the Anglo-
American criminal justice system, 
a person can be held criminally 
responsible if he performs a prohibited 
act intentionally and with a statutorily 
specifi ed mental state (which may span 
such things as “purpose”, “knowledge”, 
“recklessness”, or “negligence”) [39]. 
Yet even if these criteria are satisfi ed, 
the defendant can be excused from 
liability if legally insane. That is, he 
may have intentionally and knowingly 
committed a proscribed act, but be 
found not blameworthy nonetheless, 
because a mental condition meeting 
a specifi ed legal (as distinct from 
medical) threshold prevented him 
either from knowing the nature 
and quality of his act, or from 
understanding the wrongfulness of the 
act [40].
The possibility of being “not guilty 
by reason of insanity” can be traced 
back to the well-known M’Naghten 
case in 1843. While attempting 
to kill the British Prime Minister, 
Daniel M’Naghten mistakenly killed 
the Prime Minister’s secretary. 
Experts maintained that M’Naghten 
exhibited such a vast deterioration 
in his reasoning abilities (believing 
the Prime Minister to be heading a 
murderous conspiracy) that he had 
no comprehension of the act he 
committed. The modern standards 
for determining legal insanity, in 
the long wake of M’Naghten, vary 
markedly across jurisdictions, with 
results that have prompted many calls 
for reform. For example, psychiatrists 
have been plagued by the need to 
answer dichotomously whether a 
defendant is “mad” or “bad” or to 
opine that “it is not him, it is his 
disease” [41]. Furthermore, medical 
research indicates that patients with 
selective damage to the PFC can often 
know right from wrong, but still be 
unable to act on such knowledge. This 
has naturally led defence attorneys 
and prosecutors to pursue more 
objective ways of determining whether 
a defendant is competent to stand 
trial, and if so, whether he can be held 
legally responsible for his actions. 
This, in turn, has generated signifi cant 
interest in brain-imaging evidence 
concerning a defendant’s mental 
functioning (Box 2).
Several examples illustrate the kinds 
of contexts in which many believe that 
brain imaging may aid the law’s ability 
to accurately assess a defendant’s mental 
functioning. Consider the case of a 40-
year-old man who inexplicably became a 
sexual impulsive with paedophilia. The 
patient had no prior history of sexual 
misconduct, but it was soon noted that 
he was frequenting prostitutes and 
that he attempted to molest his 12-
year-old step-daughter. He was quickly 
reported to the local authorities, was 
found guilty of child molestation, and 
was sentenced to either attend a 12-step 
sexual addiction program or face jail. 
Despite a strong yearning not to go to 
prison, the patient could not inhibit his 
sexual impulses. It was soon discovered 
that the defendant had a large tumour 
pressing on his right orbitofrontal 
cortex (Figure 2). Upon the resection 
of the tumour, the patient’s sexual 
impulsiveness diminished. When the 
sexual impulsiveness later reappeared, 
a brain scan revealed that the tumour 
had grown back. A second resection of 
tumour again diminished the patient’s 
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050103.g002
Figure 2. Cases Where Brain Anomalies Have, or Have Not, Been Linked to Anti-Social 
Behaviour
(A) Brain scan of patient J. S., who exhibited sociopathic behaviour [5]. The image shows a lesion in 
the orbital frontal cortex.
(B) fMRI sagittal slice of the brain of patient J. Z., showing a lesion that was caused by the resection 
of pituitary tumour [4]. This lesion led to anti-social conduct, which was not exhibited before the 
surgery.
(C) Orbitofrontal damage associated with symptoms of paedophilia and sexual misconduct in the 
case of a 40-year-old male patient.
(D) Photograph of a patient after head injury (right) and fMRI scan 60 years later showing PFC 
damage (left) [53]. This patient showed personality changes, but no signs of anti-social conduct.
(E) Cranial X-ray of a man who attempted suicide with a crossbow. Although the individual 
exhibited premorbid APD, the PFC damage caused by the crossbow arrow resulted in reversal of 
anti-social conduct [54].
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sexual impulsiveness [42]. Another 
illustration is the 1998 case of 15-year-
old Kip Kinkel, who shot and killed his 
parents and two high-school colleagues 
in the state of Oregon. Brain imaging 
was used as evidence in court to 
support Kinkel’s “not guilty by reason 
of insanity” plea. The trial defence 
provided evidence of small cavities in 
Kinkel’s frontal lobe. Although there 
was no evidence that this abnormality 
caused his behaviour (Kinkel was 
ultimately convicted as an adult and 
sentenced to 111 years in prison [43]), 
future developments in neuroscience 
may again aid courts in these kinds of 
inquiries.
These examples raise important 
questions not only about the extent 
to which neuroimaging may affect 
particular trial outcomes, but also 
about the ways in which the legal system 
can come to understand changing views 
of the brain, assess when those views 
are relevant, and determine how, in 
appropriate circumstances, to integrate 
that knowledge into legal decision-
making [44] (see Boxes 2 and 3). For 
example, recent evidence suggests 
that the PFC continues to mature 
until the age of 25 [45] and that this 
maturation correlates with ability in 
counterfactual (if–then) thinking [46]. 
An underdeveloped ventrolateral PFC 
can be directly associated with poorer 
cognitive control [47], which some 
consider a core variable in criminal 
activity [48]. Such research and theory 
likely warrants serious consideration, 
given the robust relationship between 
age and violent criminal offences. For 
example, British Crime Survey statistics 
show that individuals between the ages 
of 16 and 24 commit more violent acts 
than all other age groups combined.
Such statistics have a special 
relevance in countries such as the 
United States where the death penalty 
is applied. For example, many lawyers 
who oppose capital punishment of 
juveniles hold the view that the legal 
system should take such neuroscientifi c 
evidence into account (e.g., the Justice 
for Children Project; http://moritzlaw.
osu.edu/jfc) [49]. It is possible that 
the 2005 decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States (Roper v. 
Simmons) that made it illegal to use 
capital punishment for any offender 
who was under the age of 18 when he 
committed his crime was infl uenced in 
part by evidence presented in amicus 
(so-called “friends of the court”) 
briefs, which included neuroscientifi c 
evidence [50].
The Limits of Brain Imaging 
as Evidence
There are many exciting possibilities 
for how law and neuroscience 
may eventually partner—with 
neuroscientists discovering new things 
about the brain potentially relevant 
to law, and law asking questions that 
new neuroscientifi c research may help 
address. However, it is important to 
keep in mind a variety of limitations 
of brain-imaging technology. We 
highlight six.
First, functional brain imaging is not 
mind reading. Not only can it not tell 
us what or how a person was thinking at 
the time of a legally relevant act, it also 
cannot tell us with reliable accuracy 
what a person is thinking while being 
scanned. In this respect, brain imaging 
can only provide post hoc explanations 
[31]. The challenge of functional 
brain imaging has been likened to 
looking from an airplane window at 
night: when we look down from the 
plane we see complex patterns of 
lights, which we can demarcate into 
towns and cities and we can gaze at 
their connections through linking 
road lights. However, from the plane 
we achieve little understanding of the 
different, social, cultural, and political 
differences that exist in these blobs of 
light [51]. With respect to fMRI, this 
analogy is supported on a technical 
level, as the details of the relationships 
between metabolic demand and 
increased neuronal activity are poorly 
understood.
Second, as important as brain 
functioning is, brain imaging provides 
only one window of many into the 
multiple infl uences on behaviour that 
can be relevant to understanding why a 
person acted in an anti-social manner. 
Such infl uences include the intricate 
interaction between genetic, prenatal, 
endocrinological, social, cultural, and 
economic factors; “No pixel in a brain 
will ever be able to show culpability or 
nonculpability” ([52], p. 100).
Third, despite showing remarkable 
consistency with lesion, animal model, 
and electrophysiological data, brain 
imaging is not yet in Kuhnian terms a 
“pure science”. Interpretation of brain 
scans is admittedly somewhat subjective. 
Anatomical landmarks in the form of 
gyri and sulci differ very much from 
individual to individual, and even in 
adulthood the brain is not fi xed, but 
shows plasticity and change in response 
to injury that also varies from individual 
to individual. Moreover, in the case of 
fMRI, differences in haemodynamic 
response may not necessarily relate to 
neuropathology, but to vascular and 
endocrinological pathology. Thus, 
even if brain abnormalities are found, 
individual differences in the extent and 
location of the injury, and in recovery 
and plasticity, present major problems 
for the interpretation of brain images 
in the legal setting.
While these problems can be 
reduced in research through averaging 
across many individuals, these are 
Box 3. Plausible Uses of Brain 
Imaging and Questions for 
Future Research
Questions for which brain imaging might 
provide useful answers:
• Does the defendant exhibit any 
neurological damage?
• Do the brain abnormalities fi t with the 
nature of the crime?
• Is the defendant faking an illness?
• Is the defendant lying about the crime?
• What is the likelihood of future 
transgressions? 
To begin to answer such questions, 
society needs the following: 
• More neurobiological research on 
anti-social and criminal populations 
(e.g., post-mortem histology, 
diffusion tensor imaging, and brain 
morphometry).
• A better classifi cation of the neural 
activity associated with different types 
of criminal activity.
• A set of criteria and parameters for 
using imaging on single individuals 
with and without neurological 
abnormalities.
• Better understanding of the effects 
of intrinsic and extrinsic factors on 
the brain (e.g., interplay between 
environment, development, and 
genetics).
• Agreed criteria concerning validity and 
reliability of brain images. 
• Agreed procedures for presenting 
imaging evidence in the courtroom.
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critical issues when examining a single 
individual. For example, all the brain-
imaging studies conducted on violent 
and anti-social populations have 
studied group effects. Moreover, most 
studies have examined adult males, 
and the results cannot be generalised 
to females and children. Accordingly, 
if brain imaging is to be applied to 
the forensic evaluation of the single 
patient, a standardized set of tests, 
procedures, and imaging parameters 
are needed to achieve more valid 
conclusions (see Box 3).
Fourth, correlations between brain 
function and criminal behaviour are 
imperfect, calling into question both 
the diagnostic and predictive validity 
of brain-imaging evidence. That is, 
brain defects are not observed in all 
violent criminals, and conversely, not 
all people with PFC damage exhibit 
anti-social behaviour. For example, 
one longitudinal case study showed 
PFC damage to result in personality 
changes, but without signs of anti-social 
behaviour [53]. Some studies have 
shown how prefrontal damage can 
even decrease anti-social behaviour 
[54]. Differences in the PFC may also 
be caused by other variables, including 
levels of education and alcoholism 
[55]. A similar pattern emerges for 
the amygdala, where damage can 
result in increased or decreased 
aggression [23,56]. Moreover, in 
court proceedings, many experts have 
argued against the use of ambitious 
speculations concerning the brain 
(e.g., State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis 
Reid Jr., 2002, No. 38887), particularly 
where the link between the criminal act 
and the neurological damage is based 
solely on brain-imaging data.
Fifth, just as it would be 
inappropriate to expect full localization 
of criminality genetically [57], it 
would be inappropriate to expect full 
localization of criminality neurologically 
[37]. Indeed, sociologists have long 
provided explanations for crime and 
deviance without the slightest reference 
to the brain.
Sixth, brain images are not only 
powerful, they can potentially be too 
powerful—an effect we have referred to 
as the “Christmas tree phenomenon”. 
For example, in much the same way 
that a prosecutor may sway jurors 
with sympathetic pictures of the 
innocent victim, the defence may 
show brightly coloured images of the 
perpetrator’s allegedly dysfunctional 
brain. The vividness and technological 
sophistication of the images may be 
over-weighted by the jurors, which 
can warp justice just as surely as can 
under-weighting of relevant evidence. 
Brain imaging can be admissible 
in courts of different jurisdictions 
(e.g., under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in the United States). 
However, given the increasing public 
interest in brain imaging [58] and 
the misinterpretations of what brain 
imaging is and can do [59], it is crucial 
for proper legal decision-making that 
judges and jurors understand the 
limitations of brain imaging.
Concluding Remarks
The goals of science and of law 
are different. However, important 
legal questions such as moral 
blameworthiness, culpability, 
responsibility, and the likelihood of 
recidivism depend to some degree on 
improved understandings of human 
behaviour. Therefore, biological 
advances in understanding human 
brain architecture and function may 
overlap in important ways with legal 
inquiries. New studies of the criminal 
brain are likely to shape moral views 
on responsibility and free will, with 
possible impacts on how legal systems 
punish and treat criminals [60].
A growing body of research gives 
us good reason to believe that some 
kinds of brain dysfunction can affect 
the probability of different kinds of 
criminal behaviours. However, despite 
our growing knowledge of the brain 
abnormalities associated with anti-social 
and psychopathic behaviour, there are 
as yet no concrete biological markers—
genetic or physiological—that can 
predict such behaviours. Violent and 
anti-social behaviours undoubtedly arise 
from a symphony of factors. Optimal 
understanding will require cooperation 
among many disciplines such as 
economics, sociology, psychology, 
evolutionary biology, cellular physiology, 
and neuroscience [61]. 
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